Evolution of Marine Corps Amphibious Doctrine; an Essay,
by Brian Scace
email: sarge@nist.gov

OVERVIEW,
- Where the Army's prosecution of the war in the ETO followed a highly developed and tested doctrine already in place by the time of the United States' entry into the war, the Naval services only had the benefit of school environment development to establish the new amphibious strategies. Tactical development was based almost solely on the review of such utter failures as the Galipoli disaster of WW I, and some very limited experiences gained in the Caribbean interventions during the 1920s. The island campaigns of the Pacific Theater, therefore, were tactically an "innovate, adapt, and overcome" type learning experience as we shall see.

- This also should now make it obvious why you, as a historian, find it easy to gather material about the use of the equipment that you collect having to do with the ETO. Field manuals and battle accounts describing the tactical use of your gear abound. Because of the ongoing development of a radically new doctrine in the Naval Services, this type of information is not available to the student of the Pacific Campaigns. There were no FMs because no one knew what to expect, let alone what to teach others to expect. There are Fleet Marine Force Manuals (FMFM), written after the war, which explain amphibious doctrine. These are useful, however it should be realized that they only reflect the state of the art as of 1945 with postwar modification for use as training material. The development of the doctrine is not reflected in the FMF Manuals, nor is postwar development segregated from 1945 experience for our convenience.

- Our purpose is to, hopefully, fill some of this historical void, and allow you to more fully understand the use and significance of the items in your collection pertaining to the Pacific War. Our emphasis is on the Marine Corps, so reference to such pivotal events as Midway and the New Guinea campaigns will be minimal. One should, however, realize that the influence on the Corps by both the Navy (TBX, TBY for example) and the Army (EE8, BC1000) is very important to the understanding of your collection.

- Prior to 1930, the Marine Corps mission was primarily to provide the Navy with forces on board ship and the State Department with embassy personnel. The use of Marines as a large ground force was limited to, for example, the Mexican War Campaigns of the 1840s (the "halls of Montezuma"), Lejeune's Marines as part of the 2nd Division of the AEF in World War 1, and the "China Marines" of the first third of the 20th century. Where the latter was a logical development of the embassy element of the core mission, the former two events were regarded as bad experiences in the hands of the Army, who was placed in overall charge of these forces, and good reasonw for limiting the Corps operations to those within the core mission.

- As the 1920s became the 1930s, however, it became increasingly apparent that a war with Japan was a possibility. Officers of the Army were studying various war-game scenarios at the War College at Fort Leavenworth, as were officers of the Navy and Marine Corps at the Naval college at Newport. Indeed, both schools exchanged students ("Bull" Halsey went to the War College at Leavenworth, for example) and both schools studied and played the same scenarios. These were the so-called Rainbow Plans. Each scenario, or plan, was known by a particular color. The Orange Plan is the one most important to our discussion.

- The Orange plan recognized the growing threat of Japan and her "Greater East Asia Co- Prosperity Sphere". The Japanese had assumed control of the Pacific island groups formerly under German rule (the Marshalls, Marianas, and the Carolines) after WW I as a reward for Japan's support of the Allied cause in that war. It was recognized that the Japanese were probably secretly fortifying these islands in violation of treaty and that, should hostilities begin, these islands would become jump-off points for attacks on adjacent American held islands such as Guam and Wake, stores-rich localities such as the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, and the Commonwealth Nations of Australia and New Zealand.

- The successful prosecution of the Orange Plan in the school environment made obvious to the participants several strategic concepts. First, given worst case (the plan was often played at Leavenworth from 1934 on as part of a larger two-ocean scenario against a "Nazi Confederation" consisting of Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia and the Pacific), the Pacific was a Navy problem. Second, the only way of successfully prosecuting the scenario was with select amphibious invasions of key islands in the theater. Third, this unenviable task would be the purview of the Marine Corps. Admiral Chester Nimitz said at the conclusion of the war that nothing that strategically unfolded in the Pacific was a surprise to the Navy after Pearl Harbor because the Orange plan had been played to successful conclusion so many times by so many officers of the Naval Services.

- Meanwhile, the Marine Corps was engaged in several small actions in the Caribbean and in Central America. The experiences gained in Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua gave the Corps a strong small unit doctrine and valuable jungle experience. This, coupled with an aversion to large operations brought on by the late experiences with the Army, gave junior officers and the NCO corps good experience to draw on, for they would be the field grade officers and senior NCOs who would create the tactics that would be typical of the Pacific campaign.

- As we can see, the school scenarios, combined with the Caribbean experience, resulted in a new core mission element for the Corps as specified by the Chief of Naval Operations in 1920. Amphibious assault was added to the shipboard and embassy elements. As early as 1921, Major John Ellis began work on the basic concepts of Marine amphibious assault, resulting in several drafts of "Advanced Base Force Operations in Micronesia", which laid out the basic doctrine to be followed 20 years later. Annual exercises commenced in Hawaii and in the Caribbean in 1922, but were curtailed for budgetary reasons four years later. The Corps did not abandon the further development of the concept, however. Two significant publications appeared, describing the new mission element. First, in 1933-34, was the "Tentative Doctrine" which was played against the Orange plan, then revised to "The Manual for Naval Operations Overseas" in 1938. Meanwhile, by 1934, amphibious training recommenced off North and South Carolina. By the beginning of 1942, the Naval Amphibious Warfare Center on (prophetically) Solomon's Island in the Chesapeake Bay was established. There, wartime training began in earnest.

- What does all this have to do with your collection? You'll probably notice that there is little in the way of decent man-portable radio gear available. Unlike the Army, whose doctrine was one of large mechanized formations penetrating great distances at speed to a strategic objective on a continental scale, the Corps was concerned with small chunks of ground, geographicly limited by water, taken by non-mechanized small formations. The resulting difference lead the Army down the communications path emphasizing the development of some of the finest tactical radio gear in existence, such as the BC 1000. They felt that speed of the advance required maintenance of communication not possible with wire for the forward elements. Radio was the logical choice.

- The Marine Corps had no such ambitions. They realized that wire was more dependable, more secure, and more readily maintained by the average individual than radios. Further, because speed of the advance was not a tactical issue in the Corps amphibious doctrine, the advantage of not having to string wire for radio was not felt to be worth the disadvantages. Throughout the war, the Marine Corps was served well by this decision. Although the BC-1000 was adopted by 1945, the battalion's switchboard, wire, and field phones remained the basic means of command and control for the vast majority of combat situations encountered by the Corps during the war.

- The most significant development of radio communication in the Corps, by far, was in the field of fire support. Fire support consists, for the purpose of our discussion, of both off-shore Naval gunnery and close air support.

- Early on, back in the "Tentative Doctrine" days, it was realized that off shore fire support was an important part in the pre-landing and landing phases of an amphibious operation. No-one knew at the time how hard it would be to apply effectively, however. Although it was then thought that this fire could be effective shot "blind", it was proven that spotted fire was the only effective method during the war. As wire does not lend itself to offshore use very well, some AM manportables such as TBX and TBY were introduced for the purpose.

- The use of close air support as a tactical asset was developed from practically nothing to its arguably most effective state during the war by the Naval services. Again, wire does not lend itself to this use.

- Both of these assets became available, not only because of the new amphibious mission, but because of the most radical shift in Naval doctrine since oars. The aircraft carrier became the Capital Ship. Naval battles were no longer decided in the Jutland fashion by battleships and cruisers. The fleets didn't even need to see each other to fight a decisive engagement with the airplane. This did not mean that the battleship and the cruiser were obsolete, however. On the contrary, they had a home in the Amphibious Doctrine waiting for them as floating artillery.

- Where small unit (up to battalion) command and control stayed deeply rooted in wire in the Corps, Naval fire and close air support liaison activities grew from absolutely nothing even by the Solomons campaign of 1942 to the incredibly huge Joint Assault Signal Company (JASCO) by Iwo Jima. JASCO was a division level support company, staffed by both Naval and Marine personnel, numbering over 400 by the TO. It is the direct ancestor to the smaller (thankfully) Air/Naval Gunnery Liaison Company (ANGLICO) of the Korea and Vietnam era.

- To more fully understand the development of the command and control, tactical communication, and liaison doctrine of the Corps, a review of each of the major campaigns in the Pacific along with an assessment of the lessons learned should be undertaken.

THE SOLOMONS
- To more fully understand the phenomenal growth of JASCO, compared with the tenacity with which the Corps stuck with wire for internal command and control, a review of the major campaigns of the Pacific War and the resulting lessons learned is useful.

- Although first blood was drawn by and on the Corps at Pearl Harbor and during the heroic defense of Wake Island during the latter part of 1941 and early 1942, for our purposes the first campaign in our purview is the assault by the 1st Marine Division in the Solomons. The primary objective of this campaign was the islands of Guadalcanal and Tulagi. The seizure of these islands marked the beginning of Operation Watchtower, the occupation of the Solomons chain. Watchtower was the first step in what would become MacArthur's (and the Army's) drive through the Solomons and New Guinea to the Philippines.

- On 07 AUG 1942, Marines of the 1st Division, under the command of Maj. Gen. Archer Vandegrift landed on Tulagi and Guadalcanal. At the time, there were fewer than 1,000 Japanese combat troops in opposition. Those troops withdrew to await re-enforcements and the Marines landed essentially unopposed. By the second day they had occupied the unfinished airfield on Guadalcanal, which was re-named Henderson Field, and work commenced to complete it. Tulagi was also quickly secured.

- On 09 AUG the operation went sour when an element of 5 cruisers moved to head off a Japanese fleet strike moving in on the invasion force down "the Slot", a channel down the Solomons Chain. In the resulting engagement, the Japanese fleet soundly defeated the Allied element, sinking four of the five cruisers engaged. This loss of defensive capability compelled the Naval commander, Rear Admiral Kelly Turner, to order the withdrawal of the entire invasion fleet as undefendable. This action denied the 1st Marine Division its re-enforcements and supplies still afloat. Although this was probably the only option open to Turner, the lack of communications with the Marines ashore caused them to assume they had been abandoned by the Navy, a view held by many of the "Old Corps" to this day. The Japanese then landed 6000 additional troops to retake Guadalcanal, forcing Vandegrift on the tactical defensive. The resulting skirmishes resulted in a see-saw affair with the Americans in the defense with marginal air superiority from the "Cactus Air Force" off Henderson field and the Japanese on the offense with marginal sea superiority. The contest finally escalated to the point where the Japanese had committed over 30,000 troops on Guadalcanal by October. By November, a steadily resupplied Vandegrift went over to the offense. In December, the badly depleted 1st Division turned over the secure and operational Henderson Field and the remainder of the operation to the Army's Lt. Gen. Alexander Patch and the reenforced Americal Division.

- In Vandegrift's after action report, it was stated over again that the use of wire for command and control was sound. The only dissenter from that position was Col. Lewis (Chesty) Puller, who stated that wire was too slow and that manpack radio was the way to go. Puller did not take into account the security issues mentioned by both Vandegrift and Col. Edson (of Raider fame). Edson mentioned in detail that the Japanese were consistently in any radio net he established and that the use of "nicknames" was the only way that they could be sure that any transmission was authentic. Corps doctrine for the use of wire was proven viable, however more effort was made from then on to speed up the laying and establishment of command and control wire nets. This was the Corps first experience with radio security problems and they reacted by taking Edson's advice regarding rotating code encryption of radio traffic.

- Where the command and control doctrine remained relatively intact, the liaison issues from Guadalcanal were in serious need of reevaluation. First, of course, was the breakdown in communication between the Navy and Marine Corps after the 09 AUG disaster. The solution proposed was to investigate the use of manportables at the division level to maintain contact with the assets offshore. The prep fire from the Navy was considered adequate for the landing, not requiring control other than the timetable established in the text of the invasion order. The fact that the landings were essentially unopposed was not taken into account in this assessment. Air support was also considered under control, although tactical targets were only defined through the established command and control nets and relayed to air assets before takeoff. Both of these conclusions were to be re-evaluated after the near disaster at the Corps' next stop: Tarawa.

TARAWA
- On 20 NOV, 1943, the 2nd Marine Division assaulted Betio, the principle island in the Tarawa Atoll. Tarawa, part of the Gilbert Chain, was assumed to be lightly defended, however, Rear Admiral Keiji Shibasaka knew that an amphibious assault was doomed to failure if stopped on the beach and prepared accordingly. The pre-invasion and invasion preparatory fires were conducted as they had been on Guadalcanal, although the period of fire was increased to four hours before the first wave was to hit the beach. As was doctrine at the time, the fire was laid "blind" and advanced inland by the timetable set forth in the fire support annex of the invasion order. Unfortunately, the timetable was upset by the lack of accounting for low tide exposing a barrier reef off the beach. Equipment on landing craft had to be off-loaded into LVTs (Landing Vehicle, Tracked or "Amptracs") for the run to the beach and the troops had to wade in on foot. Once on the beach, the Marines had an unexpected surprise handed them from a non-obliging Adm. Shibasaka. This was not to be the unopposed landing that the 1st Marine Division saw on Guadalcanal. Of 5,000 Marines participating, 1500 were casualties by nightfall. After three more days of brutal combat marked with spider holes, bayonets, flamethrowers, and nighttime banzai charges, the island was declared secure with a final count of over 1,000 dead and 2,000 wounded Marines. Fewer than 20 of the best of the Japanese Naval Infantry survived. This made Tarawa proportionately the bloodiest battle of World War II, and created a fury of opposition at home for further operations of its type unless sweeping changes in tactical doctrine were made.

- Again, the use of wire for command and control worked well, while the use of various man portable radios fell further into disfavor because of reliability problems. Salt water and the brutal combat conditions made radio so notoriously unreliable at Tarawa that its use for command and control was largely discontinued until the Corps finally, and with great aution, adopted the Army's BC-1000 in 1945. Even then, primary reliance on wire for command and control in the Corps persisted until well into the Post-Vietnam era.

- Tarawa also proved that the then current doctrines for fire support and close air support were woefully inadequate against a determined foe. The pre-landing fires were completely ineffective, both because of the mistaken notion that enough could be laid in the four hours allotted, and because it was only fired on preplotted targets assumed to be significant by the scanty intelligence available rather than actively directed by observation. Further, the application of the landing phase fire by timetable proved worse than useless as long as the Navy was unaware of schedule deviation from the original invasion order caused by stiffer than expected resistance.

- Tarawa was a very expensive lesson, one that caused the Corps to go out of the invasion business until a complete rewrite of communication, off-shore fire support, and close air support doctrine was completed. The pre-war assumption that amphibious assault placed a prohibitive advantage with the defender was proven in four bloody days. However, this was not a lesson lost on the Corps or the Navy, as was proved in January of the following year in the Marshalls.

THE MARSHALLS
- The key to the Marshalls was the atoll of Kwajalein. This, the worlds largest coral atoll, consisted of some 18 islands with Roi and Namur to the north, and Kwajalein Island at the south end. This also represented the first pre-war Japanese holding to be assaulted by the Americans in the Pacific.

- The operation began on 31 JAN 1944 with the sequential assault on the communications and logistics centers on Roi and Namur, then Kwajalein Island by the 4th Marine Division and the Army's 7th Division. The operation concluded by 04 FEB with much more acceptable casualty figures than the Tarawa campaign. Where the American forces numbered over 41,000 committed, 372 of that number were listed as dead or missing. Once again resistance was fierce with the Japanese losing all but 35 captured after intense close quarter combat, again hallmarked by deep entrenchment and fortification in depth.

- The Marshalls campaign marked the introduction of many new innovations on the part of the Navy and Marine Corps. The Navy's pre-landing preparation by carrier based aircraft lasted for several days. During the landing and post-landing phase, Marine and Navy officers rode the back seat of several aircraft, constantly in contact with air assets aloft and Naval gunnery offshore. This marked the first use of aircraft to control Naval fires during an amphibious operation. Further, the fire support was no longer based on timetable, but was controlled during the operation based on "phase lines". As the ground forces achieved each sub-objective, they reported in to the Divisional command and control element. Then, orders were given to fire those targets having to do with the next sub-objective in the operation by radio to air assets already aloft or warships standing by. These fires could also be readily redirected based on new intelligence from the Marine and Navy airborne observers or new developments reported from the forward ground elements.

- The Divisional command remained off shore in another new development, the command and control ship. For the first time, command ships outfitted with specialized communications equipment controlled the battle. Overall command and control of the entire operation, Navy, Army and Marine, was finally centralized.

- The Joint Assault Signal Company was introduced in this operation. The official Marine Corps history of the Marshals Campaign describes their duties thus:
"The primary mission of this unit was do coordinate all supporting fires available to the Marine Division during an amphibious operation. In order to carry out this function, the company was divided into Shore and Beach Party Communications Teams, Air Liaison Parties, and Shore Fire Control Parties. During training the various teams were attached to the regiments and battalions of the division. Thus, each assault battalion could become familiar with its shore and beach party, air liaison, and fire control teams."

- Because of the vastly increased use of voice radio inherent in these new developments, another unique twist was added. Navajo Indians were employed as radio operators. Their unique language sped communication by not requiring messages to be rotationally encrypted as in previous voice practice, while still denying the enemy the information contained in the transmissions.

- Finally, the massive and thorough pre-landing preparation by Naval air and gunnery assets (the so-called "Spruance Haircut") proved their worth. The prolonged pre-landing phase denied the enemy the use of any of their air assets in the Marshalls. No Japanese aircraft rose to oppose the operation.

- On 17 FEB, the final phase of the Marshalls campaign, the assault on Eniwetok commenced. The 22nd Marine regiment and the Army's 106th Infantry Regiment landed on what was again to be an artfully defended objective. The new formula was proven viable as most of the 3,500 man Japanese 1st Amphibious Brigade was annihilated by the pre-landing bombardment, post-landing artillery fire, and the use of flame throwing tanks. The atoll was secured on 23 FEB with an American loss of 348 killed or missing.

THE MARIANAS
- The next major campaign in the Central Pacific was the move on the Marianas. Located about 1,000 miles east of Eniwetok, their seizure would allow the new B29 to more easily operate over the Japanese home islands. From their introduction until the seizure of the Marianas, the B29 had been operating out of bases in the China-Burma-India Theater. The flight from China to Japan was grueling and only the southern portion of Japan was within range. Results were indifferent and attrition was high. So it was that Gen. Holland M. Smith's Marines, re-enforced by Army National Guard troops was assigned the task of taking these strategically vital islands.

- The keys to the Marianas were the three islands of Guam, Saipan, and Tinian. Saipan was the first invaded on 15 JUN. Again, as at Guadalcanal, the Japanese challenged the landings with Naval forces although in much greater quantity. This time, they were soundly defeated in the Battle of the Philippine Sea. The Marines on Saipan were unaffected.

- However, it was discovered that the Japanese had also learned much from the Tarawa and Kwajalien assaults. The defense in depth on Saipan was so carefully crafted that three brutal weeks were required to finally take the island. U.S. losses, again, were uncomfortably high. Some 15,000 soldiers and Marines were killed, wounded, or missing. The Japanese lost some 42,000 killed.

- Guam, also, was well defended in depth. Three weeks were required to take that island starting on 21 JUL. Losses were high, almost 7,000 soldiers and Marines compared to about 20,000 Japanese.

- The Tinian assault began on 24 JUL and was secured in a week. Another 2,000 Marines were added to the overall cost for the Marianas. Another 15,000 Japanese defenders died.

- The Marianas were very expensive for several reasons. The sizes of the defending garrisons were huge, so large that almost every square yard had a spider hole in it. The disposition of these forces was such that the preparatory fires had little effect on them. Further, it forced the attackers into operation in squad and sub-squad elements for extended periods. This exposed a weakness in the Marines' almost complete reliance in wire for battalion command and control.

- Wire C and C nets of the period at the battalion level were structured along the lines of the battalion's Tables of Organization. The Marine Corps was organized similar to the Army's then current "Triangular Division". Very basically, this entailed an organization breaking down into three subordinate units. Hence, an infantry division had three regiments, not including support elements. A regiment had three rifle companies, plus a heavy weapons company and a headquarters company. A company had three rifle platoons plus a weapons platoon and a headquarters element. The battalion CP, therefore, had a six circuit BD71 switchboard and phones. It was the responsibility of the battalion wire section to place wire to each of the subordinate elements. The switchboards of the period were in multiples of six circuits (six with the BD71 and twelve with the BD72) allowing for one circuit each to the three rifle companies, one for the weapons company, one for the headquarters company, and the remaining one strung to the next higher headquarters, in this case to the regimental command post.

- As long as each rifle company was operating in a relatively cohesive manner, the company commander could keep control of his platoon leaders with this system. In the Marianas, the squads making up the platoon were operating on their own for long periods because of the type of defense encountered. Platoon leaders were, therefore, having to deal with the problem of control any way they could. Company commanders were often completely in the dark as to the current situation with their platoons and communications therefore were often completely severed at the bottom of the chain of command for extended intervals.

- The problem was further aggravated because the defense encountered required calls for support elements such as artillery, off-shore fire, and air strikes to prosecute squad level engagements. The JASCO only broke down to the battalion level so that they were swamped with individual pleas for assistance from some sixteen to twenty simultaneous engagements being prosecuted by elements of the battalion at any given time.

- The solutions proposed as a result of these lessons learned included the increase in size of the battalion level JASCO element and quick adoption of squad level "walkie-talkies" and platoon level tactical radios. Fortunately for the Corps, the equipment already existed in the excellent Army Signal Corps designs and was available in quantity. Unfortunately, the timing of MacArthur's South Pacific campaign resulted in the decision to assault the Palau Islands before the JASCO organizational changes could be implemented and the company elements could fully integrate their new communication assets.

PELELIU
- As a result of the conclusion of the New Guinea campaign by the Army, General MacArthur pushed for the seizure of the Japanese base on Peleliu in the Palau Islands as a necessary clearing of his flanks and a resulting staging area for the return of U.S. forces to the Philippines. The 1st Marine Division, with the 81st Army Division landed on 15 SEP, barely a month after the conclusion of the Marianas campaign. There was, of course, no time to apply any of the lessons learned from the Marianas to the planning of the Peleliu assault, and the results were predictable.

- What was to be a two day assault became a two month grind, again hallmarked with squad level offensive action against a determined defense in depth. The campaign lasted until the end of November, when the remaining 300 defenders capitulated. The cost was high, some 2,000 American lives. The real tragedy was in the fact that MacArthur changed his strategic timetable and was fully established in the Philippines by the conclusion of the Peleliu assault, rendering it unnecessary. This did little to further Army-Marine relationships.

IWO JIMA
- In the central Pacific, the remainder of 1944 saw B29 operations against Japan shifted from the CBI Theater to the new airstrips in the Marianas. This placed the entire of the Japanese home islands easily within strategic bombing range. One thing that became immediately clear during operations, however, was the need for a base within the operational range of escort fighters such as the P51. Further, it was desirable for such a field to recover damaged B29s that could not make their bases in the Marianas.

- Meanwhile, the Japanese were preparing their last lines of defense under the name of Operation Ten-Ichi-Go. Unfortunately, the island chosen by Nimitz as a fighter escort base, Iwo Jima, was also a key element of the Japanese defensive plan.

- Iwo Jima was only 750 miles south of Tokyo, and part of the same volcanic range that comprises the Japanese islands themselves. On 19 FEB 1945, three Marine divisions landed on Iwo Jima. The defense encountered was what you could expect from a desperate foe. Caves had been dug in the volcanic rock such that the three day bombardment did not materially affect them. There were 21,000 defenders there to greet the Corps. Again, the Japanese had been adapting as fast as the Americans. Artillery, encased in bedrock, blasted the LVTs as they lay on the beach. They were unable to move in the loose volcanic ash. The geographic highpoint, Mt. Suribachi, was taken on 23 FEB and Iwo itself by 16 MAR. U.S. casualties numbered over 25,000 with almost 7000 of them KIA. Gen. Howland Smith found himself defending his conduct of the battle during the ensuing public outcry over the casualty figures. He maintained that the Navy had not followed his recommendations, especially in light of the lessons of the previous fall's campaigns. Smith said that the pre-landing fires should have lasted ten days, not three.

- The Marianas, Peleliu, and Iwo Jima had exposed a basic weakness in the amphibious doctrine of the Naval Services. The capacity for off-shore Naval fires had reached their practical limit. In conventional landbased warfare such as was fought in the ETO, logistics for the resupply of artillery are primarily only limited by production and transportation capacity. Naval gunfire is inherently limited by the capacity of the firing vessel's magazines. Once exhausted, the ship must leave station and be resupplied from the "trains" of the task force. As one can well imagine, this is very time intensive for the warship and tonnage intensive for the task force trains. Further, the warship must retain some of its limited ammunition stores in case an emergency change of situation requires it to intercept an enemy fleet or react to air attack. Aircraft carriers are, of course, subject to the same logistical constraints. Hence, Smith's assertion that the fires were not adequate were quite probably valid, but the Navy could not do much about what was a fleet capacity issue. These campaigns illustrated with uncomfortable clarity what would be in store for Allied forces in an invasion of the Japanese homeland.

OKINAWA
- Operation Olympic, the invasion of Japan, was slated to commence on 01 NOV 1945. Prior to the start of Olympic, appropriate staging areas were required, so attention was turned to Okinawa and Operation Iceberg. Okinawa, the largest of the Japanese Ryukyu islands, was only some 350 miles from Kyushu and boasted both port facilities and airfields. Landings by a newly formed 10th Army, numbering 290,000 troops began on 01 APR. The 10th Army consisted of the Marine Amphibious Corps and the Army's XXIV corps, supported by an approximately 1600 ship fleet. The landings and first few days went well with surprisingly little resistance. This was a welcome change from previous experience, where the beachheads were hotly contested.

- It was when the attackers reached the outposts of the "Shuri" line that the bloodbath began. The situation quickly deteriorated to the same squad level offensive operations against an excellently deployed and well fortified defense in depth as in previous experience. The 82 days spent in conquering Okinawa cost the ground forces 7,613 dead, over 30,000 wounded; the fleet suffered 4,900 dead or missing and 5,000 wounded. The Japanese lost 127,000 killed or missing along with approximately 100,000 civilian dead.

- There was little to add to the tactical doctrine. Marine squad, platoon and company communications functioned as well as could be expected with pretty much the same equipment as the Army. Wire was still the staple of battalion command and control nets. The division JASCO topped off at over 400 people in an attempt to handle all the calls for air and fire support. The forces afloat were taxed to the limit in ammunition capacity and cycled ships out of the line, to the trains, and back again in formations, rather than individually. The Japanese had upped the ante by attacking the fleet with suicide boats and some 6,000 kamikaze planes. The fleet lost some 263 ships sunk or damaged by the desperate attackers. This development required a shift on the ratio of ammunition types in the shipboard magazines in favor of the anti-aircraft gunnery. There was now even less room for large caliber ammunition aboard those ships firing missions in support of the troops ashore. These factors, along with the fanatical defense ashore, spoke of a dismal, bloody, grind ahead for the Marines, Navy, and Army who were to invade Japan. Prospects for new developments in amphibious doctrine were few. Expectations for Olympic were understandably not optimistic. Meanwhile, 900,000 Japanese troops were waiting on Kyushu.

- In August, the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Japanese agreed to surrender on 15AUG 1945.

ASSESSMENT
- The Naval Services entered the Pacific war with a well thought out strategy based on the school prosecution of the "Orange" Plan. The amphibious doctrine used to execute this strategy was in place and trained for by the Marine Corps as it existed between the wars. This yielded the Naval Services a small core command structure and non-commissioned officer pool well versed in amphibious warfare and strategic employment of amphibious forces. At the beginning of hostilities, this nucleus was quickly employed training the rapidly expanding Naval Services for the actual prosecution of the "Orange" Plan.

- Where the speed of the advance in the mechanized warfare more typical of the European heater required the Army to quickly adopt voice radio for primary command and control, the Marine Corps stuck with wire communication for command and control throughout the war. The speed of the advance in the island campaigns was slow to the extreme against the defenses encountered. The advantages of wire over radio are security, reliability, and repairability. Modifications to that doctrine were few, other than the removal of the division level command and control elements offshore to command ships after Tarawa.

- Tactical communications within the company structure changed radically. Where it was originally thought that the company commander could control his platoon leaders face-to-face or, at worst, with runners, the defenses encountered required extended independent operations by platoon and squad size elements. The Corps tried various Naval Services radio designs, primarily TBX and TBY, before settling on the excellent Army Signal Corps FM designs for company level and lower tactical nets. The Army and Naval Services continued to use common designs of tactical manpack voice radios (AN/PRC-10, 25, 77 etc.) in the Cold War era.

- Although it was realized from the onset that assaulting a beach against a prepared defense was an expensive undertaking in both men and material, too much confidence was initially placed in undirected off-shore Naval fires as a mitigation to the inherent advantage vested in the defender. Each campaign taught both attacker and defender new lessons. The developments in the employment of preparatory fires in the Naval services included aerial spotting in the pre-landing and landing phases, the use of the Joint Assault Signal Company solely to coordinate fires in support of the forward elements during the landing and post landing phase, and the dedication of Naval off shore and aviation assets solely to the task of fire support of the amphibious force.

- The size of the JASCO reached and actually surpassed its practical limit by the end of the war. After the conclusion of hostilities, JASCO was re-examined and the size reduced to more manageable levels, resulting in the Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) of the Cold War era.

- Practical limits were also reached in the ammunition capacity of the Fleet. This served to limit the duration of preparatory fires in the pre-landing and landing phases. Further, the number of ships dedicated to fire support during the post landing phase incrementaly increased with the size and depth of the defense, placing a strain on the logistics required for support of each successive operation. When "Kamikaze" was pressed in great numbers, such as at Okinawa, shipboard magazine space dedicated to antiaircraft ammunition increased at the expense of space dedicated to large caliber ammunition suitable for the fire support mission. This required that ships return to the fleet trains more often for large caliber resupply than in previous operations. We can conclude that off-shore fire support capacity reached and probably exceeded its practical limit in the final operations of the war. Further, the situation would probably have further degraded during an amphibious invasion of Japan.
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>I've read in the past that the difference in pace between the Army and
>Marines was due to doctrinal differences; the Army slower with more
>artillery, bombing, etc., while the Marines were faster, more '
>aggressive'. I remember reading that some Army folks criticized the
>Marines for their attitude towards the Army's doctrine. Question is:

>Was this mostly a doctrinal difference or were there real issues
>that the Army failed to execute its own doctrine?

There are considerable doctrinal differences...I can't comment on Saipan specifically, but the Army was better geared to longer duration, greater distance campaigns...they tended to want to soften, smash and exploit/pursue ....there is no exploitation/pursuit on an Island the size of Saipan. THe Army's view of Marine tactics is "3 yards in a Cloud of Blood" ...a not totally accurate description either. There is no way to out maneuver an enemy dug in on a small island ...it has to be done frontally at great cost...speed does help, if you can get things crumbling before you , as it demoralizes the enemy and may prevent him from getting local reinforcements in place. The Armies idea of maneuvering units out of position and "saving lives" worked in Europe...might have worked in China, but was useless and wasteful of time in the islands campaign. Incidently, as part of my C&GSC course (during more current times), I compared loss rates [Using Offical US Army Planning Tables] for a "Soviet style Breakthrough Attack" and a US Style Attack to breakthrough enemy lines...both over about 5 days. The US [Army] style sufferes fewer casualties on the first day or so, but over the period, it suffers more ! The Soviet style suffers 10-15% fewer casualties over the 5 days...but they are all front loaded, with lead battalions wiped out [ =84 70% casualties] and follow up units walking through... there is a similar relationship with Marine vs Army tactics on the Islands, where the Army methods actually cost more casualties if a quick end to the fighting was not reached.

jconeil@primenet.com (Jim O'Neil)
----------------------------------------------------

"The reason the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices it on a daily basis".

from a post-war debriefing of a German General
----------------------------------------------------

Dennis:

- I tend to think that the difference of opinion between Smith and Smith had little to do with "doctrine differences". While the Saipan campaign was going on, there was also a like campaign going on on Guam. The forces on Guam also were a mix of USMC and an Army division. In this case, the Army performed well within the satisfaction of the overall Marine command, including "Howlin' Mad" Smith. Previous joint operations had also gone satisfactorily for all concerned. Remember that the tactical aspects of the Marine Amphibious Doctrine was being "perfected" at the same time as for the Army. I believe, therefore, that one cannot cite a Service doctrine difference as responsible for the rift between Smith and Smith. One also cannot really say that the Army's ETO performance based on mechanized warfare would have much of an affect on the pace of the Army's overall tactical doctrine in the Pacifac, which was based on Light Infantry, just as the Marine Corps doctrine was. The "overall differences" in tactics between the Corps and the Army in the Pacifac just aren't there.

- Where the problem was, seems to have been a personal difference in how to proceed. Smith (USMC) was audacious to the extreme and as intolerant to any perceived caution as he was to any difference of opinion. He was also given to assigning blame to others for any critisism of an operation under his command. We see this again at Iwo when he blamed the high cost on the Navy's perceived lack of adequate fire support. Smith (USA) was inexperienced and cautious. He also had a calm, studied, and deliberate command style which was the exact opposite of Smith (USMC). Sounds to me like a simple conclusion can be drawn here, and that people are trying to read way too much into what was a classic personality clash.

Brian Scace <sarge@nist.gov>

-------------------------------------------------

Ed) I tend to agree with Brians assessment. For further information on the subject, see;

Military Collector Group Post, Dec.20/97
Evolution of Marine Corps Amphibious Doctrine;
an Essay, by Brian Scace

******************************************************

AGENT RADIO OPERATION DURING WW-II;

Forward,
- "Studies In Intelligence" was a CIA published in-house magazine that was classified for many years. Last year, Pete McCollum obtained through the Freedom of Information act, several of their now declassified articles. The following is one of those articles. It is interesting in that it includes some examples of enemy clandestine radio operation rather than just those of the Allies for which much has been printed.

Dennis
------------------

- During World War II the use of clandestine radio for agent communications was widespread. Literally hundreds of agent circuits were operating during the war. On the enemy side they ranged in type from highly organized nets involving German diplomatic installations to single operations in such widely scattered places as Mozambique and isolated locations in the United States. On the Allied side there was no part of Axis territory where we did not have clandestine communications representatives --- "Joes," as they were called. It was almost impossible to tune a communications receiver of an evening without running across signals which were so obviously not what they were trying to seem that you wondered why they were wrapped up the first time they came on the air.

- On both sides the signal plans (call signs, frequencies, and times of transmissions) and procedures used by agents were for the most part of the utmost simplicity. One service was also easily distinguishable from another by their different characteristics. The random contact times and frequent changes in wavelength considered to be essential today were represented by uncomplicated regular patterns simple to reconstruct. In many cases the rota--the cycle in which the plan repeated itself-- was of only a week's duration. Often only the list of call signs was carried out to a 31-day rota.

- The agent was generally given a reasonably good range of operating frequencies, usually between five and ten, to help protect him from detection and arrest, but he was often his own worst enemy. Certain times and frequencies, because they afforded better operating conditions either radiowise or from a personal standpoint, became his favorites. Almost nothing his base could say or do would convince an agent he was endangering himself when he abandoned even the simple non-repetative pattern of his signal plan in favor of the convenience of operating day after day on the same frequency at the same hour. It must be said, in all fairness, that in some cases this practice was almost unavoidable because of the agent's need to live his cover. In others, however, it was stupidity, laziness, or complete incomprehension of the need for good radio security. Security laxness was particularly foolhardy of those who operated alone without benefit of "watchers" to warn when enemy personnel were approaching.

- Four types of agent radio operators can be distinguished--those who operated in metropolitan areas in concert with well organized watcher organizations; those who operated on their own in cities; those who were with the guerrilla groups; and those who worked alone in isolated rural areas.

The City Mouse,
- In cities a variety of techniques were employed to protect the operator. In one case as many as five operators in widely separated areas were geared to function as one station. All had transmitters on the same frequency and copies of the traffic for a given schedule. If the enemy approached the vicinity of a particular operator, he would stop transmitting when signaled by his watcher, and at the same time another operator in a remote part of the city who had been listening to his colleague would, with hardly a perceptible pause, continue the transmission. As necessary, a third would take over from the second and so on, much to the frustration of the opposition. In another instance long-abandoned telephone lines were used to key distant transmitters, whose remoteness from the operator greatly increased his security. These and other sophisticated devices were employed successfully in target areas where an extensive and highly organized underground was able to create the conditions for them.

- In the main, however, a less imaginative but equally effective means of protecting the operator was used--teams of watchers strategically placed in the streets around or on the roof of the building in which the agent was working his set. When the enemy direction-finding trucks or personnel with portable sets were spotted approaching, a signal would be sent to another watcher either in the room with the operator or close enough to warn him to stop transmitting. Usually the warning was enough; but one agent was so intensely anxious to get the traffic off that he repeatedly ignored the warnings of his watcher on the roof above him. A string had to be fastened to the man's wrist, with the roof watcher holding the other end, so that he could literally yank the operator's hand away from the key!

- Less is known about the singletons who operated alone in the cities. They lived lonely, frightened lives, particularly tense during their transmissions. Frequently they had the feeling that the enemy was just outside the door waiting for the right moment to break in, and sometimes he was. The most grateful moment in the singleton's day came when he heard the base send ""Roger. Nothing more." Sometimes the base operator would impulsively end with the letter GB ES GL--"Good bye and good luck"--even though he knew it was against the rules.

- The lone agents who survived owed their lives to a highly developed sense of security and intelligent use of the resources available to them. They went on the air only when they had material they considered really important and they kept their transmissions short. They either were or became such good operators that they approached the professional level in skill. Sometimes they were able to change their transmitting procedure from what they had been taught to one which enabled them to greatly reduce their time on the air. They took advantage of unusual operating locations and moved frequently. In addition, they undoubtedly owed to good fortune: many who were caught were victims as much of bad luck as of enemy action. One German agent in Italy who had most skillfully and successfully evaded Allied apprehension over a long period was caught only with the casual help of an Italian woman. After watching with curiosity the efforts of a DF crew in the street for some time, she finally approached the officer in charge and diffidently offered the suggestion, "If you're looking for the man with the radio, he's up there."

- Some singleton agents who were unable to live alone with their secrets were spotted because of their inability to keep their mouths shut. Their compulsion to tell a sweetheart or a friend or to draw attention to themselves by living or talking in a manner out of keeping with their covers resulted in their apprehension. And yet they sometimes got by with incredible indiscretions. There was one case in which the base, having taken traffic from a "Joe" in northern Italy, was to close down when Joe, in clear text, asked if it would take traffic from "George," an agent who had been trained and dispatched from a completely different location. The base operator was flabbergasted, but took the transmission and then asked the man in the field to stand by for a short message, which was being enciphered, to the following effect: "Where did you get that traffic and where the hell is George?" his answer was prompt and again in the clear: "From George, he's on leave." For several days Joe continued to send in George's messages, evidently prepared in advance, as well as his own, until George showed up on his own schedule and resumed business as usual. To the best of our knowledge these two agents remained unmolested and free of control; they were contacted regularly until Allied troops overran the area.

The Country Mouse,
- The radio operator with a guerrilla group came in for his share of difficulties too. First of all, he usually arrived at his destination by parachute. Often his equipment was damaged in the drop. Many times he had to lug it over almost impassible terrain in a wild scramble to protect it and avoid capture. Sometimes he never got on the air at all, and he and his teammates would be the subject of melancholy speculation on the part of his comrades at headquarters until some word trickled back as to what happened to them. The radio man was expected to do his share of the fighting when the situation demanded it; and injured or sick, he was supposed to keep at his radio as long as he was strong enough to operate it.

- The singleton in the country was usually no worse off than his counterparts in other situations, and sometimes much better off; occasionally he was an honored quest. But his status varied with the moods and political views of the so-called friendly leaders of the area, and at times he was viewed with suspicion or open hostility. The agent or agents he was supposed to retrain often resented him and added to his difficulties. He developed skills beyond those he had brought with him: equivocation, tact, flattery, subterfuge, and downright dishonesty became abilities essential to the doing of his job. His one thought was to get it done and get out in one piece and on to the next assignment.

- Occasionally the agent operator interjected into his otherwise anonymous transmission burst of temper, directed or eloquent disgust. Usually these outburst were spontaneous profanity, unenciphered, directed at the quality of his signal, the base operator's poor sending, or some other immediate cause of annoyance. They most often came in the agent's mother tongue, but a certain group of German clandestine agents used to swear at their base operators with great eloquence in beautifully spelled out English.

- Not all such expressions of opinion were sent in the clear. Over the years, enciphered messages have been generously spiked with agent invective and profanity. One such message received during the war, a marvel of succinctness, spoke volumes on the subject of what makes an agent tick. The agent in question had been trained as a singleton. It had been planned, with good reason, the he should be dropped several hundred miles ahead of the bulk of his equipment, of which there was a great deal, and he should make his way to it later. The operation went according to plan except in this respect; all the agent's gear was dropped with him. In due time the base heard him calling, established contact, and took a brief but carefully enciphered message, which when decoded was found to consist of one extremely vulgar French word. The agent was never heard from again.

The Ingredients of Partnership,
- What kind of person made a good agent operator? His special qualifications required that he be young or old, tall or short, thin or fat, nervous or phlegmatic, intelligent or stupid, educated or unlettered. His political views were of no consequence. If he had a burning resentment at having been thrown out of his country, or having lost family or friends, so much the better--or maybe worse: uncontrolled hatred could create security problems. He didn't even have to like radio very much. About the only attributes he really needed were: ability to put up with all the unpleasantness of six weeks of radio training to get at least a nodding acquaintance with the project; a willingness or desire to go anywhere by any reasonable means of conveyance--"reasonable" includes dropping fifty feet from a plane into water--and stay for an unspecified period of time; and the abiding conviction, in spite of feeling constantly that someone was looking over his shoulder that it would always be the other guy who got caught. In short, he must come to like his work and take, with the well-educated call-girl, the view that he was just plain lucky to get such a good job.

- At the base end of a clandestine circuit a good operator was, in his own way, different from any other radio operator developed during WW-II. And he was proud of it. In the first place he had to learn to live in a world of noise, an experience which occasionally resulted in permanent psychoses or suicide. The agent transmitter was and is a miserably feeble communications instrument, capable under the best of circumstances of putting only very small amounts of radio energy into the ether. Being illegal it had to compete with jammers, commercial telegraph, and broadcast stations, whose signals often exceeded it's power by tens of thousands of times. If the reader can picture himself surrounded by the brass section of a large orchestra playing one of the lustier passages from Wagner while he is trying to hear and identify a different melody coming from a piccolo played by an asthmatic midget in the balcony, he will in soon measure approximately the auditory frustration of the base radio operator searching for and copying some of the typical agent signals.

- Yet this small group of men not only took pride in their work, but because they understood the problems of their unseen friends on the other end of the line, went out of their way to make sure that their agents got the best service possible. Frequently they would become so concerned about a certain agent that they would get up during off hours at whatever time of day or night their particular Joe was scheduled to come on, to make sure that he would be properly copied, even though the base operator assigned to that watch was thoroughly competent. And he regular operator never resented this interference with his watch; he probably had done or would do the dame thing himself.

- The devotion and skill of these otherwise apparently undedicated and average men was equal to almost any demand. Sometimes as many as five operators would voluntarily concentrate on one agent transmission, piece together the fragments each made out, so the man could get off the air as fast as possible. They learned to recognize the agent's signal as he was tuning up, in order to shorten the dangerous calling time. They managed to make sense of spastic tappings of obviously nervous agents and through their own efforts and example frequently instilled confidence in them. If they did not accept with good grace the often unwarranted criticism leveled at them by the agent, at least they did not reply in kind.

- They recognized their special friends by the way they sent their characters and were in many cases able to tell when the agent was in trouble or had been replaced at the key by an enemy operator. In many instances they developed a sixth sense which enabled them to hear and copy signals correctly through prolonged burst of static or interference and they developed shortcuts which further reduced the agent's time on the air. Many of these shortcuts became the foundation for more efficient and sophisticated methods of operation.

- Their patience was truly marvelous. When necessary, they set day after day listening for a man who had never been contacted or who had disappeared for months. That he might be without equipment, drunk, or dead made no difference to them. As long as his schedule was on their contact sheet, he was real and they looked for him. If he showed up they nearly always established contact.

- Not every man assigned as radio operator to this type of base station made the grade. Some tried and just didn't have it. These nobody criticized, and other useful duties where found for them; but those who didn't take the work seriously were not tolerated and soon left the station. The good ones came from all walks of life. Unlike the agents, they were trusted nationalist of the country operating the station. They were draftees, professional communicators, amateur radio operators, philologists; but almost without exception the had imagination, skill, and a deep (if frequently unrecognized) love for both radio and that type of radio work in particular. They were in short a new breed, the clandestine intelligence service radio operator.
*****************************************************

MANUFACTURING OF RADIO EQUIPMENT IN FRANCE UNDER THE GERMAN OCCUPATION; by Feyssac Jacques

A short story about a complicate period of our French history.

- If there is a difficult period to describe, this one is; specially if you try to collect data about the production of electronic firms during that period. To all the remaining companies involved during these four years this period has never exist! This short article is based on testimonies of people I met during the past 20 years that were more or less involved in these activities, for this reason it is incomplete and fragmentary.

- In July 1940 the German occupation forces of the "Zone Nord" put their hands on 90% of the French electronic industrial production that was located in or near Paris. Most of these were manufacturing products for the French Government as it took us many months to realize that our Military Comms equipment were definitively outdate, we were trying desperately to manufacture new and modern equipment. Very quickly they start to control the production of French and German equipment.

HOW THE EQUIPMENT WAS PAID FOR.
- France was imposed during the 8-8-1940 Peace treaty signed with Germany to pai for the housing and expenses of the German occupation Army. The daily amount was extraordinary high, 400 million Francs (1940 Francs), or if you prefer 9. 933 445 million dollars (1940 Dollars). A sum that was in fact much more than necessary, and the exchange rate of the Reichmark very high per comparison to the Franc. The German Buying offices that were installed in Paris had plenty of money available and they did use it to pay for industrial contracts awarded to French companies but also spies, traffickers, nazi militia and a network of blackmarketeer in charge to collect and buy strategic materials ranging from gold & copper to rabbit skins!

WHAT WAS THE POSITION OF THE INDUSTRIALS.
The position was quite clear :
-You accept the contract, fulfill it, and was paid.
-You did not accept the contract; then two solutions , a requisition was issued and you accept it ; if you dont then the plant was considered as a war requisition, dismantled, and the managing staff sent to jails or internment camps in Germany.

- As you can see they had not much of a choice! Also for some industrials, having contracts with the occupation forces was a means to keep their plants running and keeping his work-force in France, as already a part of them were War prisoners in Germany (having been former French military). The industrials were divided in two categories: the family or private owners and the public companies. In both cases most of them had followed a wait and see policy, slowed down their production in occupied France and create subsidiaries in the Free Zone to continue radar, radio developments and manufacturing of equipment for the "French Army of Armistice" and many of the leaders were involved in "Resistance movements". In fact, happily, few industrials would fully cooperate with the Germans.

WHAT FRENCH EQUIPMENT WAS MANUFACTURED FOR THE GERMANS (As you can understand I have not much information on all materials!)
- The Lufwaffe would order in great quantity a Vhf receiver, Sadir-Carpentier R-87 (more than 1500) they were used to make a Vhf Direction Finder, as at that time this superheterodyne receiver was an excellent and modern type based on 955 tubes in push pull for HF and Mixer oscillator stages.

- The Kriegmarine had used the METOX R-600 OR 5FuMB 1, Vhf receiver as an early warning receiver for detection of British ASV radar in the centimetric range and the quantities used were quite important (1000 or less)

- Hf receiver transmitter type Saram 3-10 was also manufactured for use as a ground station by the Lufwaffe.

- An excellent short wave receiver SFR type RU-93 renamed FU-438 was also delivered in some quantity.

- Some other French equipment types were used by the Germans, either newly manufactured or captured for operation by the occupation troops in secondary roles.

WHAT GERMAN EQUIPMENT WAS MANUFACTURED FOR THE GERMANS
- Before the war at less two big companies had contacts with German industrials, they were "Compagnie des Compteurs" and "Société Francaise de Radioelectricite" these contacts were mostly in the field of television research and licenses. These contacts were renewed from the German side by the Telefunken Company and these companies given production contracts of German equipment.

- What generally appears from all these contracts, is that we never manufacture any "Modern" equipment, most of the time it was the generation of 1936 to 1938. SFR did manufacture the 15WSE transmitter receiver ; E-336 peil empfanger (HF -df receiver), battle tank intercoms. Telefunken sub-contracted them the industrial development of the AS-59; 200 watts transmitters ; SFR was producing so slowly that the money was missing to pay the 4000 employees working in the different plants ; Telefunken always came to help and advanced the necessary money! At the liberation the debts of SFR to Telefunken was 50 million francs or $1,241,927; and only 100 technicians were sent to Germany to the "mandatory work service" and all were working in Telefunken plants.

[Ed) It would appear that SFR through the illusion of cooperation was able to stall the German war effort, drain funds from Telefunken, and spare their valued workers the perils of internment camps.]

The company named "Le Materiel Telephonique" was an wholly owned ITT company ! Like LORENZ ! they did the "wait and see" politic without too much troubles but they did manufacture SEG portable radio link antennas and accessories, and also had quite a few sub contracts for the Lorenz company who was also an ITT subsidiary.

ABOUT "SABOTAGE"
- One witness of that period who was a young technician at the SFR plant in Cholet; gave a brief description of the German industrial management at that time. German organizations installed "Meisters" (supervisors) in plants. They had all powers; were in charged to control the quality of the works, mechanical and electrical tests. If you have military German equipment and if you look at it in detail, you will see in many places stamps of the inspectors controlling all the steps of the process! They were ISO-9001 long before us! So the problem was : how to botching the job?? It took them some time to find a way, but they found it and it was a smart one.

- At the end of the manufacturing process and testing of the radio set, it was submited to extreme temperature test in a climatic chamber and rechecked again to see if everything was still operating, at that stage and when the "meister" was away they raise the temperature enough as to damage the paper condensers used in the set(there was no plastic part used at that time !!!), the result was a set passing the test normally but generally the capacitors started to leak in the coming 6 months putting the set out of operation very quickly.!

- At the same time and under the camouflage of civil contracts for PTT(Poste Telegraphe Telephone) the studies and manufacturing of Radar and Radio equipment was maintain to a small scale and permited to the companies involved to train staff and prepare the future; but many people paid with their lives for this activity.

AT THE END
- When the country was liberated, most of small industry slowly return to peace time works in a devastate country, but some equipment as the transmitter AS-59; 200 watts transmitter remain in manufacture for the needs of the French army.

- The same technician told me that the factory stopped production for three months beginning in July 44 awaiting an answer from Paris to the question: What we do now? ; they receive the following order, Keep going on with the manufacturing of the 15 watts Transmitter receiver of the German army !! And they did until mid 45 for the French army ! If by chance you pass through Cherbourg and pay a visit to the "Fort du Roule". You will see one of those sitting in the window near an ELSTER made by LMT/ITT !!!

- From those dark days a group of Frenchmen would make their way to the USA and create the SCR-291 and SCR-502, also the famous "Huff-Duff" but that is another story !

References
"Souvenirs de longue Vie " Book written by M. Girardot former General Manager of SFR
War souvenirs , testimony by Mr Venet.

Feyssac Jacques
<feyssacj@aol.com>

MEMBER WRITE;
Re: Sabotage at German war factory
Some years back i read a book by a Christian evangelist writer, Korrie Ten Boom. She was arrested and sent to a German slave labor camp. In the book she says she worked assembling aircraft radios and sometimes she sabotaged the work by slipping in a wiring error. Perhaps occasional errors work just accounted to the malnourished tired condition of the workers. We know sabotage was not looked at with mercy. At the Dora Works, which manufactured V rockets, there were multiple hangings of slave workers who didn't meet the production quotas, as an example to others.

Hue Miller
<kargokult@proaxis.com>